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During the 20th century, the ‘subject’ of knowledge (i.e. the individual scientist or a scientific 
community) was attributed an increasingly relevant role in (the philosophy of) science. 
Anchoring scientific knowledge to the subject (rather than to the object, as in early positivism) 
was proposed as a ‘liberating’ move, leading to a less authoritarian and rationalistic view 
of science. This article provides a reformational point of view on the topic. A historical 
documentation of the shift to the subject is provided by visiting the philosophies of Popper, 
Kuhn, Collins and others. It is argued that the promise of a more libertarian or emancipating 
conception of science was challenged by several problems. In particular, the conflict between 
an individual and a communal understanding of the subject is highlighted. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the roots of the phenomenon in most cases remain hidden. An interpretation of 
the shift and the sketch of an alternative approach conclude the article.
Introductory notes
For a long period since the 1850s, science seemed to rely on the facts, and facts seemed to speak for 
themselves. Especially in the early positivist period, the facts, their observation and ‘collection’ 
were supposed to lead to objectivity and certainty. The best ‘role’ the subject of scientific research 
(either an individual or a community) could play was to stay out of the picture as much as possible. 
No personal or group prejudices (religious or metaphysical) were allowed in the laboratory or 
in the study-room. All this was perceived by many as liberating: it would have opened the way 
to scientific truth (which was the only truth), and it would have created progress and consensus.
At a certain point, however, this approach began to be perceived as almost ‘oppressive’. There 
was something authoritarian in its rationalism, perhaps in its a-historical approach, and (in 
Botha’s 1988:43 words) a ‘revolt against positivism’ took place1. The revolt involved discussions 
of discoveries and justifications, evidences and theories and a whole conglomeration of specific 
topics. Basically, however, the revolt could be characterised as a shift: scientific knowledge was 
gradually anchored in the knowing subject (and not in the objects anymore). One could say that 
the subject was regarded as the new locus ordinis2 for reality in general and for science in particular. 
Again, the new approach was regarded as ‘liberating’, as leading to a more ‘humanitarian’ 
(Feyerabend’s term) type of science. 
This article tries to explore this ‘shift’ and to evaluate it. In my opinion, a proper recognition 
of the role of the subject in science is necessary. However, the ‘revolt’ against positivism did 
not result in liberation but was confronted by inner tensions which need to be pointed out and 
examined. Although this article does not try to examine all the possible problems created by (or 
1.The emergence of anti-positivist arguments can of course be comfortably traced since the early 1930s in the works of Popper. However, 
the ‘revolt’ was anticipated to an extent by authors like Duhem or Poincaré in the first two decades of the 20th century.
2.Latin: ‘the foundation or source of order’.
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related to) the shift to the subject in philosophy of science, 
it points out some problems that have not been discussed 
before, in particular the tension between an individualist 
and a communalist understanding of the knowing subject. 
In addition, it is argued that the roots of the phenomenon 
in most cases remain hidden to both secular and Christian 
scholars.
This article displays several examples to illustrate and 
observe the process and its consequences. Afterwards, a few 
clarifications and reflections are followed by my evaluation 
and interpretation of the shift. All analyses are conducted 
along reformational lines. The historical survey begins with 
Popper, whose philosophy can be regarded as a ‘bridge’ 
between positivism and some of the subsequent and more 
subjectivist philosophies of science.
Popper
One of the first recognitions of the role of the subject comes 
with Popper’s philosophy. Compared to later developments, 
his recognition is rather timid and accompanied by 
frequent amendments. In fact, Popper retains something 
of the positivist heritage. One may think for example of 
his argument that ‘scientific knowledge may be regarded 
as subjectless’ (Popper 1970:57; 1979:106-152). He argues 
that ‘the subjectivist theory of knowledge fails for various 
reasons. (...) it naively assumes that we cannot speak of 
knowledge without a knower, a knowing subject’ (Popper 
1983:92). Yet in the case of a logarithmic table, for example, 
‘there is nobody who “knows” the table’, says Popper, ‘yet 
the table represents “knowledge”, objective knowledge (...). 
This knowledge is not “known” to anybody (not even to 
the compiler); it is only available’ (Popper 1983:95). In these 
pronouncements the influence of positivism appears to be 
relevant still. 
According to Popper (1961:155–159), it is futile to try to 
anchor scientific certainty and objectivity in the individual 
scientist, in the community of scientists or in the psychic or 
social characteristics of the human nature. Objectivity cannot 
depend on the subject of knowledge: in his view this ‘naive 
solution’ does not offer any guarantee for objectivity, which 
must rather be anchored in the objects of scientific enquiry 
(Popper 1961:155). In Popper’s philosophy, though the 
universals are presupposed, the anchor of scientific certainty 
is sought mainly in the facts and as a consequence truth is 
defined as ‘correspondence to the facts’ (Popper 1963:224).
 
Yet apparently this is not the whole story. Compared to 
previous authors, in his philosophy the subject emerges with 
more decision and gains a legitimate role. I would say, for 
example, that deductivism (adopted by Popper) places the 
subject in a more prominent position than inductivism. With 
inductivism the facts speak first, and the task of the scientist 
is to accumulate a sufficient quantity of them so that they 
can almost ‘dictate’ our theories. By contrast, the deductive 
method starts from problems, hypotheses and expectations 
(and only the subject has problems or develops conjectures).
The result is that the scientific community plays an 
important role in Popper’s philosophy. Not the individual 
but the community. He argues: ‘science and more especially 
scientific progress are the results not of isolated efforts but 
of the free competition of thought’ (Popper 1961:154–155). 
The scientific community is essential for the selection of 
problems, for proposing new theories, for mutual criticism 
and for falsification. In conclusion, Popper’s philosophy is 
one of the places where the role of the subject (as community) 
begins to emerge with force. At this stage, however, one still 
finds a fair balance, a sort of harmony between individual 
and community. Polanyi’s approach acknowledges the 
importance of the subject even more, but in his opinion the 
scientific subject is not only communal.
Polanyi
The subject as a bridge
The difference between Popper’s and Polanyi’s philosophies 
can be captured in the titles of some of their most famous 
books. Whilst Popper (1979) wanted to achieve Objective 
knowledge, Polanyi (1958) promoted the idea of Personal 
knowledge. Polanyi is a difficult author: some regard him 
as a realist (cf. Scott 1985), whilst others consider him 
a postmodern nominalist (Gill 2000). My impression is 
that Polanyi’s philosophy underwent two phases, first a 
‘conservative’ one and then a ‘postmodern’ one (Coletto 
2007:74:fn. 53, 54). In any case, I would say that the shift to 
the subject continues in his philosophy as well. The example 
that I would like to provide for this argument concerns 
scientific discovery.
Scientific discovery, for Polanyi, is not first of all a matter 
of critical rationality but a matter of personal commitment. 
In the scientific activity this commitment discloses itself 
according to its original tacit structure. According to Polanyi, 
problems are basic to science, but personal commitment 
and interest are basic in the selection of problems. In fact, 
‘nothing is a problem or discovery in itself; it can be a 
problem only if it puzzles and worries somebody’ (Polanyi 
1958:122). The selection of a problem entails in itself a 
certain risk, for example one could select a problem that is 
too demanding (ibid:124). But most importantly the selection 
of a problem discloses a ‘logical gap’ (ibid:123). This is the 
gap that must be crossed by solving the problem, but there 
is no formalised logical procedure to solve the problem or to 
make an important scientific discovery. The latter can never 
be traced by a logically connected sequence of determinable 
steps. True discovery implies an un-specifiable element. The 
presence of certain elements of unspecifiability, originality 
and personal risk in discovery points towards the notion of 
tacit knowing. Originality is not only necessary in the process 
of discovery but is also the true and characteristic mark of 
discovery.
However, the important question is: What is the decisive 
factor to cross the logical gap? At one specific instance 
Polanyi (1958:123) speaks of ‘illumination’. More generally 
he maintains that intellectual passions are the key factor and 
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are directly linked to personal commitment. The commitment 
of the person is the key factor to cross the gap, in this case a 
gap between a hidden reality and a committed knower. The 
subject, therefore, emerges as the bridge between problem 
and discovery.
In another text (Coletto 2007:35ff.), I have discussed another 
theme of Polanyi’s philosophy, pointing in the same direction. 
It is namely that the subject is also a bridge between individual 
clues and the formation of universal concepts (cf. Polanyi 
1974:171). Once again, it is the subject who bridges the gap 
and acquires a new place in science.
The personal subject
As far as the role of the subject is concerned it must be 
admitted that Polanyi succeeds in maintaining a fair balance 
between individual scientist and community. Yet within 
this balanced position I would say that more emphasis is 
gradually placed on the individual.
In his initial writings one can observe the considerable role 
given to ‘tradition’, authority and to the community of science. 
The transmission of knowledge from one generation to the 
next (i.e. tradition) is almost sacred; it is defined as ‘a sort of 
apostolic succession’ (Polanyi 1946:44). The individual who 
joins the tradition initially can only adapt to it and be formed 
by it. Nevertheless, one’s independence from a ‘master’ 
gradually grows and one’s conscience needs to become the 
final judge by which decisions are taken. There is no pope in 
science, says Polanyi (ibid:56ff.), in the sense that authority 
is not centralised but ‘distributed’. No authoritarian party 
should be allowed to dictate the lines along which research 
should develop or solutions should be sought. Here we have 
the important theme of the harmony between ‘authority and 
conscience’ (ibid:42–62).
This theme is developed by Polanyi in connection with 
dramatic life-experiences. He suffered the invasion of his 
country, Hungary, by Soviet troops. Twenty years earlier, 
he had experienced first-hand the effects of state-controlled 
research when visiting some colleagues and friends in the 
former Soviet Union. He also followed developments such 
as the Lysenko affair, Vavilov’s persecution, and the theme 
of academic freedom of conscience became a key issue in his 
philosophy of science (Polanyi 1946:7–9).
It became crucial, for Polanyi, to oppose scientific freedom to 
state-directed research. From this point of view, the shift to 
the subject could only appear as liberating. But this freedom 
was not only individual, it was freedom for the community 
as well. He did not simply juxtapose the individual to the 
community but examined the principles leading to freedom 
and those leading to servitude. Once again, I would say that 
at this stage we still find a fair balance between individual 
scientist and community. It should be observed, however, 
that in later authors the dialectical tension between individual 
and community became more polarised.
Kuhn
Paradigm and community
The anchor of certainty is placed in the human subject 
of knowledge by Kuhn as well. Actually, Kuhn’s work 
brings the shift to the subject one step further. During the 
1970s, the Popperian school considered Kuhn’s emphasis 
on the scientific community as being definitely excessive. 
Kuhn was even accused of justifying ‘mob psychology’ 
(Lakatos 1970:140fn. 3, 178). In other words, he was accused 
of presuming that whatever the community says is the truth 
for a certain time and context. Although this problem is not 
analysed here (it has been sufficiently discussed) it constitutes 
a fundamental threat to the promise of a liberating type of 
science.
Kuhn (1970b:260–263) defended himself from those 
allegations by saying they were based on misunderstandings 
of his views. But although he was not promoting mere 
arbitrariness, he had certainly moved to a more relativist 
position. He had to recognise that his position boils down 
at least to partial relativism (ibid:264–265) (a position that 
Bernstein would call ‘partial subjectivism’3).
To acknowledge this move it is sufficient, for example, to look 
at the paradigm concept and to realise how dependent on the 
subject of knowledge it is. Each paradigm is the achievement 
of a scientific community and without community there is 
no paradigm. A paradigm ends the controversies amongst 
the schools of the pre-paradigmatic phase of science and 
establishes the consensus of a scientific community. In fact, 
initially the paradigm concept was elaborated by Kuhn to 
account for the consensus of a scientific community. The 
phases that in The structure are called ‘pre-paradigm’ and 
‘paradigm’ periods (Kuhn 1996:47, 63), were previously 
defined as ‘pre-consensus’ and ‘firm consensus’ phases 
(Kuhn [1959] 1977:231–232).
The paradigm concept is so tied to the community concept 
that Kuhn (1996:176) can say: ‘a paradigm is what the 
members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a 
scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm’. 
Although Kuhn will later specify and modify this basic idea, 
its fundamental meaning will remain unchanged.
Admittedly, for the purpose of recognising Kuhn’s 
subjectivism it is not important whether the emphasis is 
placed on an individual or a collective subject. One can safely 
say, however, that in Kuhn the communal dimension is 
dominant.
The communal subject
In this respect, it is time to start noticing one disturbing 
consequence of the ‘shift’. When the scientific community 
becomes the ‘initiator and sanctor’ (Botha’s 1994:21 
expression) of scientific legitimacy, the individual scientist 
3.Bernstein (1985) ties together relativism and subjectivism: norms, truths and 
knowledge are always related (hence relative) to a certain culture, time and 
community (subject).
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seems to become powerless. He/she cannot oppose, for 
example, the ineluctable historical processes leading to a new 
paradigm. What he/she can do, together with a few others, 
is to stick to the old paradigm, but the cost is that he/she will 
cease to be regarded as a scientist (Kuhn 1996:18–19).
Popper (1970:54), who valued the community more than 
individuals, could still reserve his enthusiasm for the 
achievements of individuals like Darwin or Einstein. But 
according to Kuhn (1970a:6), such contributions are rare 
events. Busy with puzzles as his/her main occupation, the 
‘normal’ scientist is usually not prepared to deal with radical 
innovations, not even to evaluate them. In addition, even 
genial achievements need to be endorsed by a community of 
colleagues otherwise they will mean simply nothing. 
It is always the decision of the group that counts. Each 
new paradigm will simply cancel the previous one. It will 
not constitute an alternative that can be adopted alongside 
other paradigms. The principle of proliferation is welcomed 
only when a new paradigm is needed, after which it 
disappears and only tenacity (i.e. sticking to that paradigm) 
is left. Against these rather authoritarian traits of Kuhn’s 
philosophy, Feyerabend raised his protest.
Feyerabend 
The ‘happiness of the individual’
I trust it is not necessary to demonstrate that Feyerabend 
is a subjectivist. But does he rely on the individual or on 
the community? In line with his anarchism, he prefers the 
individual. Even the purpose he assigns to science is in line 
with this: ‘the aim of science is to promote the happiness of 
the individual and the satisfaction of his manifold needs’ 
(Feyerabend 1970:210).
Feyerabend condemns all forms of authoritarianism and 
pledges plurality and freedom. Proliferation of theories 
and tenacity (the possibility of retaining refuted theories or 
perspectives) are his ideal. No scientific ‘truth’, no theory 
should be imposed on all. One should always be careful to 
respect all views: for example, some believe that the Earth 
moves around the sun, but others do not agree (Feyerabend 
1975:301). Unlimited pluralism of theories and methods: this 
chaos is the only way to generate progress, whilst consensus 
and traditionalism would surely kill it. This is why, in his 
typically colourful language, Feyerabend (ibid:188) attacks 
those scientists who behave like ‘human ants’, always ready 
to please a boss for the sake of a decent salary. They do not 
dare contradict anybody and so they betray pluralism and 
freedom. 
Authoritarian individualism?
And yet, Feyerabend’s (1975:28, 32) works contain strange 
arguments as well. He can argue, for example, that when 
it comes to methods ‘anything goes’. But he can also 
recommend one method as preferable (ibid:27), actually as the 
most suited for science (ibid:190), ‘the right method’ (ibid:66), 
the only method that can produce real progress. This is the 
‘anthropological method’ (ibid:252), directly inspired by 
anarchism. For the moment it is still early for the scientific 
community to adopt it (‘it is liable to paralyse the brains of 
almost everyone’ – ibid:214). But one day these truths will be 
acknowledged by all and the anthropological method will 
triumph. One might ask: and what will happen to pluralism 
then?
Pluralism is so important that it must be defended at all costs. 
Even at the cost of imposing it? Feyerabend (1975:50–53) 
praises, for example, the Chinese government for breaking 
the monopoly of Western medical science and forcing the re-
introduction of traditional Chinese medicine in their country. 
In some cases it might be necessary to enforce pluralism (or at 
least dualism), even by violence (ibid:187), so that individual 
freedom may become collective freedom. Even the scientific 
community needs to be controlled from outside by the 
state, or by whatever institution can keep its power in check 
(ibid:216). 
These are a few curious consequences of Feyerabend’s 
radical pluralism and individualism. The shift to the subject 
is so liberating that even those who do not want it (to borrow 
Rousseau’s famous phrase) ‘will be forced to be free’! Curious 
developments indeed: is it possible that even the liberating 
shift to the (individual) subject may acquire authoritarian 
traits?
Whilst Feyerabend was busy searching for a locus ordinis, 
especially in the ever-changing stream of history, the 
philosophy of science also experienced a sociological turn. In 
the following section I briefly analyse a representative of this 
trend in order to substantiate the claim that he strengthened 
the shift to the subject and a totalitarian view of the scientific 
community.
Collins
The locus of order is society
Whilst Feyerabend insisted on the role of the individual for 
Collins it is the scientific community that constitutes the 
order of the world that scientists explore. Collins is part 
of a larger movement that initiated the ‘sociological turn’ 
(Botha 1994:22). His Empirical Programme of Relativism is 
closely related to the Edinburgh School of the Sociology of 
Knowledge. Amongst the most representative figures of this 
‘turn’ are Brown (1984), Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1995) and 
Collins (1992).
Collins challenges the common-sense assumption that 
there is an order of or for reality that does not change, that 
shapes scientific theories, and that can (to a certain extent) 
be represented by those theories. According to Collins 
the essence of this order is rather social. Because there are 
communities that explore such order and share a certain 
language, we experience uniformities and regularities. Yet it 
is not the order that constitutes the possibility of a common 
language and of a scientific community. It is just the opposite. 
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The existence of a scientific community is the origin of the 
perceived order (Collins 1992:5). Collins (ibid:148) states it in 
a very succinct way: ‘the locus of order is society’.
Collins sets out to demonstrate that the origin of replication in 
science has a sociological foundation. He explores the case of 
the TEA-laser (for experiments in gravitational radiation) and 
two studies on paranormal phenomena. Through detailed 
observations he shows that the object of scientific enquiry has 
very little relevance in shaping our conclusions. What really 
matters is our perception. We perceive regularities and order, 
we expect the future to be like the past. But, asks Collins 
(1992:6), is there any guarantee that our ‘inductive inferences 
– generalisations from past experience – can ever be certain 
or even probable?’ Collins invites the reader to remember 
Hume’s lesson about causality. We see the movement of a 
billiard ball across the table and we are inclined to say that 
the ball is propelled by another ball. Its movement is ‘caused’, 
so our experience tells us. But, asks Collins (1992), supposing 
that the regularity of the a–b sequence were just an extended 
coincidence, ‘How would we see the difference?’: 
In other words, what is it that we see in the impact of the billiard 
ball that makes us view it as a casual relationship (...) rather than 
an extended coincidence, which we could not expect to continue? 
The answer is: nothing. (p. 7)
If we want to be able to solve this type of dilemma, according 
to Collins, we must look carefully into our social life and 
our language. The two are so intermingled that our habits 
of speech help determine the way we see the world and thus 
help form the basis for social interaction (Collins 1992:11). It 
is exactly there that our attention should focus. We perceive 
regularity and order because any perception of irregularity 
in an institutionalised context is translated by ourselves and 
by others as a fault in the perceiver or in some other part 
in the chain of perceptions (ibid:147). Scientific rules are only 
rules by virtue of social conventions (ibid:145).
Authoritarian communalism?
But is there some room then, it might be asked, for 
extraordinary contributions created by brilliant individuals 
who dare to go against the social network and its settled 
conventions? In other words, does Collins give a solution 
to the problems already experienced by Kuhn on this point? 
Collins (1992:148) admits that ‘it is only individuals who 
can provide the material for conceptual change’. But an 
individual’s act of creativity is nothing unless it becomes 
institutionalised. Even in this case, the wider ‘network’ and the 
wider society provide the conditions for the success of some 
new institutions but not others. ‘Man proposes but society 
disposes’, says Collins (ibid:149). Curiously, in his statement 
‘society’ substitutes the ‘God’ of the original proverb. Indeed 
Collin’s social networks explain everything, cause everything 
yet are in their turn not dependent on anything or needing 
any explanation. They fulfil the conditions to be considered 
what Clouser (2005:22–23) calls ‘the divine’. 
One further problem
To be sure, we could extend this article further. Examples of 
the shift to the subject would still be abundant for example in 
feminist philosophy of science or in Bruno Latour. David Hull, 
too, dealt extensively with these issues.4 However, I trust the 
above discussion is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of 
the trend and to illustrate some of its problematic traits. We 
could also insist on many other problems5 created by the shift 
to the subject and concerning science. However, I will point 
out only one more problem which is more fundamental than 
others and which reformational philosophy is particularly 
equipped to discuss. This problem does not concern only the 
individualists or the collectivists endorsing the shift to the 
subject. On the contrary, it affects both trends. The problem is 
that the shift to the subject was rarely presented for what it is.
Perhaps only Feyerabend (1985:xiii) dared to mention the 
fact that the shift corresponds to a ‘preferred form of life’, 
thus pointing towards its pre-theoretical commitments. The 
vast majority of the philosophers of science just preferred 
to describe it as a move generated within their discipline 
and to be understood within categories belonging to this 
discipline. In the next sections I will argue that this position 
is un-plausible. I will then proceed to an evaluation and 
interpretation of the shift. Before reaching that stage, 
however, a couple of clarifications are in order.
What can be done?
Some clarifications and reflections
Firstly, I have not argued that the shift to the subject was 
accepted by all, was simply un-challenged and that no 
rival tendencies appeared on the scene. There surely are, 
even in contemporary philosophy of science, trends which 
try to anchor scientific certainty in the facts and not in the 
researcher(s).6 I have rather tried to show that the shift to the 
subject involves some of the most prestigious names of 20th 
century philosophy of science and it would be therefore futile 
to try to deny it or to underplay its relevance. One should 
rather try to understand the phenomenon.
 
Secondly, I do not recommend or even support the 
subject–object distinction as a valid tool for philosophical 
argumentation. In fact, it is problematic. The mere fact that the 
targets of scientific research are always regarded as ‘objects’ 
whilst the knower is only regarded as ‘subject’ should be 
4.Hull (1988) searches for a balance between individual and community from the 
perspective of an evolutionary understanding of science.
5.For example, Van Riessen (1992) notes a fundamental problem. By grounding 
scientific knowledge to the subject one moves towards nominalism. In the latter, 
the only forms of universality are found in the subject himself/herself. This means 
that in concrete reality one meets only individual instances. It is at this point that 
incongruence is created between science and reality. In fact, scientific knowledge 
aims at the universal, not at the individual and not even at the general. Science 
is not knowledge of ‘this cow’ and not even of ‘all the cows’ in the world. In this 
way science is no more directed to reality but to the subject and his/her language, 
concepts and the like. 
6.This is the case for example for rationalist authors like Newton-Smith, for realists 
like Psillos and for the Baynesian school, when it doesn’t adopt the subjectivist 
interpretation of probability. 
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criticised.7 However, it remains an important distinction that 
helps us to understand modern (humanist) philosophy and 
philosophy of science.
After two clarifications, a reflection: the shift to the subject 
is not something occurring only in philosophy of science.8 It 
is a broader cultural and philosophical problem of Western 
culture. Also the tension between individual and community 
is not something occurring only in philosophy of science.
In political theory, for example, initially the Enlightenment 
emphasised the role of the individual. The latter was 
regarded as the fundamental ‘element’ of society, just as the 
scientific method divided its problems into their simplest 
‘elements’. It gradually became clear, however, that this 
introduced arbitrary, even anarchistic inclinations. In fact, 
the individual ‘autos’ was not regarded as subjected to 
any ‘nomos’ but rather as the source of the law. A solution 
was sought in anchoring political power in a community. 
This was perceived as plausible because the community 
was still regarded as an individual whole and therefore the 
commitment to the individuality of the Romantics could be 
preserved. However, that move didn’t help with restraining 
the totalitarian and still arbitrary inclinations of humanist 
political philosophy and practice (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:179–
180). Similar traces of the shift can be detected in many other 
disciplines.
Searching for the roots
Now, my simple argument is that if there are so many 
‘branches’ of the same phenomenon in different disciplines, 
it does make sense to search for the trunk and even for the 
roots. In other words, looking beyond the borders of the 
philosophy of science can help with understanding the shift 
to the subject better. 
I do realise that some are inclined to stick to categories holding 
for the ‘history and philosophy of science’ and to regard 
other categories as ‘unhistorical’ impositions on authors and 
their works. Such attitude, however, is often just an attempt 
to ‘protect’ oneself from acknowledging philosophical or 
pre-scientific influences, which are experienced as a threat to 
scientific objectivity, empiricism, anti-metaphysical stances 
and so forth. For example, those who deny that science is 
(or should be) influenced by ‘frameworks’ (e.g. worldviews 
or other pre-scientific commitments) will probably not be 
inclined to accept the arguments presented below.9
7.Strauss (2009:345–346) reminds us that objects have also subject functions 
in the first aspects of reality. He adds: ‘one may argue that it is an effect of the 
‘subject-centredness’ of modern philosophy (sometimes plainly designated as its 
subjectivism) that everything different from the human being is turned into an 
‘object’ (ibid:346).
8.Descartes was the first to argue that the ontological ‘ingredients’ of our world 
are either mind or extended matter (res extensa). Since then, the subject–object 
dilemma continued to trouble Modernity. Strauss (1996) offers a short but 
compelling overview showing to what extent modern philosophy is affected by this 
shift.
9.Christian scholars are not excluded from this group. For example, Suppe (cf. 
1977:125–220; 1996:267–306) and Van Fraassen (2002) are inclined to deny or 
restrict the influence of ‘frameworks’ on science, due to an anti-metaphysical 
approach linked to empiricism. For different reasons Brooke is also inclined to 
restrict the influence of worldviews (Brooke 1996 and the reply by Wykstra 1996).
Nevertheless, when one fails to consider the roots and the 
trunk of the shift to the subject, one is left with a few leaves, 
falling from the sky. This seems to me a rather unlikely picture 
of the phenomenon. Granted that philosophy of science needs 
the history of science, it also needs philosophy; actually it 
needs to consider all the levels sketched below (see Table 1) 
to keep open the possibility of a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon to be explored. 
In this sketch the categories become ‘broader’ as one reaches 
the top levels. The higher levels try to capture something 
meta-theoretical, pointing towards the ‘mentality’ of a 
certain school or thinker in a certain period. However, I am 
not arguing that once one accepts (for example) objectivism 
as one’s worldview-position the following options will 
automatically be those in the same column. The situation 
is more complex: one can be a realist concerning physical 
laws and a nominalist concerning social norms. Nor am I 
arguing that one’s position is first formed at the highest 
levels and then ‘percolates’ down to each lower level. The 
opposite direction is open as well. Finally, I do not want to 
suggest that the different levels form a kind of hierarchy. I 
rather see them as players in a field who, although they may 
be supposed to hold a certain position, may pass the ball to 
any other player. 
In the next section I sketch my own interpretation of the shift. 
In doing so, I return to the roots, to the ground motive of 
nature and freedom. One should note that ‘nature’ can be 
regarded as the object-pole of the ground motif (referring to 
the world of objects) whereas ‘freedom’ can be regarded as 
the subject-pole.
Freedom and necessity
Why would the move to the subject ever be perceived as 
‘liberating’? Perhaps the question should be preceded by 
another one: Why should the anchoring to the objects be 
perceived as ‘authoritarian’, as something constraining and 
limiting?
The answer must somehow be related to the idea of ‘nature’ 
which emerged in the early humanist reflection: a rather 
mechanistic network of laws regulating (determining) 
everything in a chain of causal relations leaving no room 
TABLE 1: Levels at which the shift to the subject can be detected.
Levels Subject Options Options
1 Ground motive (modern) Nature Freedom
2 Worldview Objectivism Subjectivism
3 Ontology Realism Nominalism
4 Epistemology Realism Idealism
5 Philosophy of language Realism Anti-realism
6 Philosophy of science Scientific realism Scientific anti-realism
Level 1 is, of course, discussed by Dooyeweerd (1979) and Strauss (2009:615–641) but 
also by Polanyi (1946:71, 81, 85; cf. Loubser 2013). Bernstein (1985) discusses level 2 and 
identifies subjectivism and relativism as fundamental options. For an overview of levels 
3–5 see Delaney (1985:1–10). McMullin (1984:25) discusses level 6. A useful (historical) 
overview pointing out the connections between some of the above ‘options’ is provided by 
Strauss (1996:105, 109).
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for chance, indeterminacy or freedom. This conception was 
inspired by the nature-pole. It soon became clear, however, 
that in this perspective human freedom was threatened.10
In an attempt at escaping such a dead-end, the humanist 
reflection resorted to the ideal of freedom, the freedom of the 
subject. Under its wings, ‘nature’ became an infinite field of 
possibilities for the expression of the un-constrained human 
personality. This shift from nature to freedom, however, was 
not conclusive. It generated a kind of pendulum-dynamic in 
which a ‘return’ to the nature motive was to be expected at 
least in some trends, in some disciplines, in some periods. 
As Dooyeweerd often notices, giving priority to one pole 
of a ground motive evokes the counter-pole. In this sort of 
oscillation between nature and freedom (and implicitly 
between object and subject), positivism can be regarded as 
a movement returning to nature, to the objects and their 
orderliness, to facts speaking for themselves, to a natural 
world in which the role of the human subject is redundant. 
Once again, the freedom of the subject is threatened, and this 
is why the following shift to the subject (the one described in 
this article and inspired by the freedom-pole) was perceived 
as a necessary and liberating move.
The quest for a ‘liberation’ was justified to a certain extent. 
Yet, as I have argued, after a relatively ‘balanced’ beginning 
(see the above sections about Popper and Polanyi), some 
problems started to emerge. For example, a dialectical tension 
was gradually (but increasingly) established between the 
individual and the communal understanding of the subject. 
Emphasis on the communal subject, on the one hand, seems 
to erase individual initiative, the possibility of dissensus, 
pluralism and freedom. On the other hand, emphasis on the 
individual subject seems to lead to arbitrariness and does not 
always avoid authoritarian tendencies. Both seem to indulge 
in some sort of relativism. In addition, the shift to the subject 
is usually not presented in its full reality but masked by 
arguments appealing to the one or the other rational necessity, 
thus failing to disclose its supra-rational commitments. It is 
from this position that one may start looking at the other 
problems mentioned above, namely the friction between an 
individual and a communal understanding of the subject.
It would be beyond the scope of this article to provide a 
detailed solution to the problems generated by the shift to 
the subject pointed out in this article. However, a possible 
way out has already been pointed out by some reformational 
philosophers. Together with Van Riessen (1992), I am 
inclined to believe that a solution should not be sought in a 
counter-return to facts and objects, a ‘shift to the object’, so 
to speak. It would be equally inconclusive to try to balance 
individual and community with a series of weights and 
counter-weights. It is the subject–object scheme that needs to 
be replaced. 
10.In this section I refer to well-known analyses by Dooyeweerd on the functioning 
and effects of the ground motifs on cultural developments. I have tried my 
best to make them ‘accessible’ to the reader who may not be acquainted with 
Dooyeweerd’s works. However, it would be impossible to re-explain in detail and 
to re-prove all these arguments again. For this, I refer the interested reader to 
Dooyeweerd’s (1984:1) own elaborated explanations.
The locus ordinis for scientific research should rather be found 
in the structural order for reality (Coletto 2007) in the laws 
holding for both objects and subjects. It needs to be realised 
that both objects and subjects are not independent sources of 
order but are ‘subjected’ to laws. According to a reformational 
understanding, in addition, both objects and subjects have 
subject-functions and object-functions. Objects and subjects, 
therefore, are not separated by a gulf but ‘tuned’ to each 
other and to the same laws.11 This perspective harbours 
the possibility of opening new avenues for contemporary 
philosophy of science. 
Brief conclusion
This article argued that choosing the subject of knowledge 
as the locus ordinis of scientific knowledge does not lead to 
any ‘humanitarian’ or ‘liberating’ type of science. On the 
contrary, it was shown that several problems affect such a 
position. A tension emerged between an individual and a 
communal understanding of the subject. It was also argued 
that the shift to the subject is rarely presented for what it 
really is and that it would be better understood by looking far 
deeper and far beyond the narrow borders of the philosophy 
of science. The roots of the problem are the roots of modernity 
itself. A solution should not be sought in a simple return to 
objectivism, but in the replacement of the basic commitments 
of modernity. 
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